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  Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract
In this paper I target the relationship between two prints that
are roughly qualitatively identical and share a causal history.
Is one an artwork if and only if the other is an artwork? To
answer this, I propose two competing principles. The first
claims that certain intentional relations must be shared by the
prints (e.g., editioned prints vs. non-editioned prints). The
second appeals only to minimal print ontology, claiming that
the two prints need only be what I call 'relevantly similar' to
one other. In the end, I endorse the second principle. There
are no trumping features over and above relevant similarity,
that is, for any pairwise comparison of relevantly similar prints,
one print being an artwork is both necessary and sufficient for
the other print being an artwork.
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1. Introduction
Printmaking as a skilled trade has been practiced for centuries,
and for much of its history artists have employed printmaking
practices or printmakers themselves to create print artworks
("fine prints"); this is especially so in the contemporary
artworld. Despite this, printmaking has been given short shrift
in contemporary philosophy of art. Other than brief treatment
from Nelson Goodman and Nicholas Wolterstorff, inLanguages
of Art and Works and Worlds of Art, respectively, printmaking
has been afforded little philosophical attention.[1] Such
neglect is deplorable because print artwork enjoys widespread
artworld presence and the nature of print artwork itself
demands philosophical scrutiny. Print artwork has an
interesting and prima facie unusual ontology¾prints are
distinct, individual artworks, not reproductions of distinct,
individual artworks. Print artworks, in addition to being
individual artworks distinct from one another, can also bear
interesting relations to other prints (e.g., tokens of the same
process-type, being in the same edition). Unfortunately,
determining what relations ought to count as substantive for
print artwork is no easy task. This difficulty largely results
from the artworld practice conforming only incongruously
(often arbitrarily so) to standard printmaking practice. Perhaps
philosophy can succeed where artworld practice has failed.
In this paper, I offer a coherent and plausible general principle
governing the relationship between print artworks, or, more
precisely, the relationship between two prints that are roughly
qualitatively identical and share a causal history (i.e., they
emanated from the same plate in the same manner—relief
prints, lithography, intaglio). Only from such a principle can we
then determine which relations ought to count as substantive
as well as provide a principled answer to the question, "Is one
an artwork if and only if the other is an artwork?" That is, I
offer a general print-artwork principle that specifies the
conditions under which, for any two prints, one is an artwork if

and only if the other is an artwork. For example, if an artist
prints an edition of twenty-five lithographs, and lithograph
1/25 is an artwork, are the other twenty-four lithographs
likewise artworks, though all distinct, individual works? What
factors, if any, either present or absent, could make it the
case that only lithograph 1/25 is an artwork? What about noneditioned prints, such as artist proofs and trial proofs?
I argue that neither standard printmaking practice nor
artworld practice can alone yield a workable principle out of
which these questions can be coherently and consistently
answered. I claim that certain intentional relations standard
printmaking practice count as substantive for prints simpliciter
shouldn't carry over as such for prints qua art. Moreover,
artworld practice fails to be illuminating because artworld
practice inconsistently counts those relations substantive. I do
not purport to inform or correct standard printmaking practice.
Rather, the view I defend should be seen, in part, as a view
about how and to what degree standard printmaking practice
ought to inform and correct current artworld practice.
2. Initial Remarks
I needn't be interested in what makes any particular print an
artwork; I need only assume that a particular print is in fact
an artwork (e.g., Sean Scully's BarcelonaDay, 2005, 31/40,
aquatint on paper). Given this, the idea is to see what follows,
given certain general principles, for relevantly related prints
(e.g., Barcelona Day, 2005, 32/40, aquatint on paper), assess
those results, and then decide which general principle to
prefer. In the interest of simplicity and efficiency, the general
principles I suggest operate only over roughly qualitatively
identical prints, or, more precisely, what I call "relevantly
similar" prints. For my purposes, two prints are relevantly
similar to one another if and only if they share all constitutive
appreciable properties in common in virtue of sharing a causal
history. Two prints share a causal history if and only if they
are printed from the same template (e.g., a particular etched
copper plate), by the same process (e.g., intaglio), onto the
same support (e.g., paper). I employ the term "constitutive
appreciable properties" as a broad, theory-neutral stand-in for
roughly those relevant descriptive physical (internal) features
of the print (e.g., color, shape, size) as well as those relevant
descriptive non-physical (relational) features (e.g., aesthetic,
semantic, representational features) supervening on, and in
part determined by, those relevant descriptive physical
(internal) features of the print. The above, though broad,
remains substantive, allowing the principles and examples I
propose to be equally salient and applicable across disparate
art theories.
3. Two Competing Practices
Of course, many current art forms have historical origins in a
skilled trade, but printmaking is one of the few art forms that
has remained largely that, a skilled trade. Most printmakers
are not artists. Likewise, many print artists are not
printmakers. Some of the most famous print artists (e.g.,
Andy Warhol, Kiki Smith, Robert Rauschenberg, Chuck Close)
never do the printing themselves; they hire master
printmakers. Moreover, printmaking isn't and never has been
principally devoted to art. For every Kiki Smith woodcut or

Chuck Close mezzotint printed, printmakers produce a million
wedding invitations, movie posters, advertisements, and Tshirts. Given this, I take standard printmaking practice to be
independent from the artworld. What it is for something to be
a print simpliciter has much to do with standard printmaking
practice but nothing to do with the artworld. The question then
is whether standard printmaking practice has anything to do
with prints as art. My focus is then on the intersection of the
printmaking world and the artworld, that is, when artists
themselves employ the techniques and processes of
printmaking, or employ actual printmakers, to create print
artworks. Presumably, artworld practice (at least of the
responsible sort) with regard to print artworks has a prima
facie commitment to conform to standard printmaking
practice. The question is whether artworld practice need do so
in all respects or just some, that is, how should standard
printmaking practice constrain artworld practice? I assume
that print artworks must preserve minimal print ontology (i.e.,
relevant similarity), but either this preservation is itself
sufficient or additional distinctions must also carry over.
4. Two Competing Principles
Two general principles suggest themselves, out of which more
detailed versions can later be formulated. Let's call the first
Permissive Print Ontology (PPO), that minimal print ontology is
a sufficient constraint on print artworks, and the second
Restrictive Print Ontology (RPO), that certain relations in
addition to minimal print ontology must constrain print
artworks.
PPO: Necessarily, for any pair of prints where x
and y are relevantly similar, x is an artwork if
and only if y is an artwork.
RPO: Necessarily, for any pair of prints where x
and y are relevantly similar and both bear
intentional relation r to A where A is the author of
x and y, x is an artwork if and only if y is an
artwork.[2]
Although RPO may be prima facie the more intuitive
ontological model given facts about standard printmaking
practice, I show that only PPO can survive scrutiny. The
plausibility of RPO depends on the specification of relation r,
and I argue that the only plausible ways to flesh out relation r
actually make RPO unworkable and counterintuitive. I argue
that not only does the specification of relation r in standard
printmaking practice fail to coherently carry over to
considerations of prints as artworks, but that no such relation
over and above relevant similarity counts as substantive for
print artworks. Moreover, PPO can, I claim, both account for
the very intuitions that make RPO look prima facie attractive
as well as avoid the problem cases RPO accrues.
5. The Case For RPO and Against PPO
PPO appears to be a relatively simple and intuitive principle.
Assume that Warhol's Flowers (1970), 1/250 (screenprint on
white paper) is a work of art. If Warhol's Flowers (1970),
2/250 (screenprint on white paper) looks the same as 1/250,
and 2/250 looks the same as 1/250 because both 1/250 and

2/250 were printed from the same template in the same way,
then of course 2/250 too is an artwork. Why would one need
to appeal to anything else? Fixing qualitative facts about the
prints and the printing process ensures that whatever makes
1/250 an artwork likewise makes 2/250 an artwork.
Additionally, PPO acts as a buffer against swamp-prints
(objects that just look the same) and forged prints (printed
from a forged template).
While PPO handles intra-edition prints perfectly well, not all
prints are editioned prints. Also notice that being an editioned
print seems to entail a certain intentional relation shared by all
the prints in the edition. If x is a print in edition E, then,
minimally, A (where A is the author) intended that x be a print
in edition E. Just as being an editioned print entails a certain
intentional relation, so to do many varieties of non-editioned
prints (those prints not counted as part of the edition). For
example, some prints, both editioned and non-editioned, are
intended as gifts, and so get marked "H.C." (hors de
commerce, not for sale). Often the artist employs a
masterprinter to print the edition, and permits the printer to
keep a few non-editioned prints (printer's impressions). Trial
proofs are those prints printed during the proofing process in
order to examine and refine the image. Artist proofs are those
proofs used as a printing guide and quality standard for the
edition or those prints leftover from the printing of an
edition.[3]
For a print to be any one of the above kinds of non-editioned
prints is, minimally, for that print to bear a certain intentional
relation to the artist. One might plausibly think that relation
bears upon whether or not that print is an artwork, despite
that print being roughly qualitatively identical to and sharing a
causal history with an editioned print artwork. PPO fails to
distinguish between an editioned print and a non-editioned
artist proof, printer's impression, or even a trial proof. The
editioned prints are intended for public reception and
consumption, while trial proofs, master proofs, and artist
proofs are intended to be corrective tools, methods of
calibration, and archival references rather than objects for
critical reception or sale. One might claim that though these
kinds of prints are importantly related to the final product (the
print artwork), they are not themselves artworks, ¾despite
being relevantly similar; this is perhaps analogous to
relationship between rehearsals and performances. Since PPO
clearly ignores wholesale what appear to be substantive
relations, the presence or absence of which might plausibly
trump considerations from relevant similarity, then so much
the worse for PPO.
Furthermore, PPO can't account for the basic notion of
permissibility, that is, PPO fails to distinguish between artistsanctioned prints and unsanctioned prints. Imagine that an
enterprising and devious art collector sneaks into an artist's
studio and presses a few prints for his own collection. Is this
person now an art thief? Did he steal an artwork or merely a
relevantly similar print, guilty only of thieving paper on which
he printed an impression relevantly similar to the prints that
are in fact artworks? Further imagine that the artist had
completed her or his edition and intended to destroy the plate
(a common practice) the next morning. Or imagine that the

thief made off with the plate itself, pressing thousands and
thousands of prints from the stolen plate. Lastly, consider an
instructively bizarre case. Imagine that our burglar isn't
interested in art or its kin, only expensive tools and
equipment. Unfortunately, our burglar is also a bungler. Upon
entering the studio, he stumbles and, by sheer accident,
crashes into the ink, paper, tarlatan cloth, copper etching and
printing press such that the physical process of pressing a
print occurs, resulting in a relevantly similar print. Spooked,
he runs off with the resultant print. Did he abscond with an
artwork or merely a fortuitously pressed non-art print
relevantly similar to the prints that are in fact artworks?
Whether a print is licit or illicit depends upon what relation it
bears to the artist. Licit prints are those prints brought into
existence with the direct or indirect (explicit or implicit)
permission of the artist; illicit prints are those lacking the
artist's permission. Some might plausibly contend that being
illicitly printed trumps considerations from relevant similarity.
Should one be even slightly leery of regarding as artworks the
thousands of prints illicitly pressed from the stolen plate, PPO
will cease to be attractive. Likewise, PPO's apparent
accommodation of accidental prints might reasonably be cause
for concern. Accidental prints per se, no matter the degree of
relevant similarity, aren't artworks, especially when, as
featured in the bungling burglar case, the print is a nonintentional, accidental print. Notice that one needn't claim that
accidental, non-intentional prints are impossible, only that,
minimally, the kind of general principle under discussion must
at least structurally accommodate the claim that a print being
accidental trumps concerns from relevant similarity, which PPO
apparently cannot do.
So far, three relations have been proposed for which,
intuitively, a general principle should count as plausibly
trumping relevant similarity: 1) what purpose the artist
intended the print to serve (trial proof, master proof, artist
proof); 2) a print's licitness or illicitness; and 3) whether the
print is intentional or non-intentional. According to PPO,
nothing can trump relevant similarity; relevant similarity
exhausts the general principle. Recall that RPO really just is
PPO with an additional requirement, that is both prints must
bear intentional relation r to the artist. Nothing demands that
RPO specify this relation in any one particular way, only that
the relation can in fact be specified in such a way as to make
RPO workable. Additionally, one needn't find all of the relations
specified above compelling. As long as RPO can accommodate
at least one of the relations found compelling, then insofar as
one finds that relation compelling, one ought to prefer RPO to
PPO. That's the point. The general argument for RPO is that
most, if not all, will find at least one relation compelling, so
most, if not all, ought to prefer RPO to PPO. If in addition to
this, RPO appears supportive, or at least consistent with,
standard printmaking practices, then again, so much the
worse for PPO.
In the main, printmakers and denizens of the artworld alike
regard editioned prints far differently than non-editioned
prints. Master proofs typically receive rough treatment rather
than a delicate touch, ending up ink-stained, tacked to a print
shop wall, or they simply get destroyed. Trial proofs, at least

those not destroyed, are seen as merely interesting historical
items, snatches of the creative process behind the edition.
Artist proofs get tucked away as records, archived epistemic
access points. Clearly then, insofar as one sees printmaking
practice as a rough and ready guide for print artwork
ontology, RPO, both consistent with and supportive of
standard printmaking practice, wins the day. Moreover, PPO
claims not only that those relations counted substantive by
standard printmaking practice fail to be substantive for print
artworks but also that nothing over and above relevant
similarity counts as substantive, thus rejecting considerations
from both licitness and non-intentional printing. So, PPO
appears bereft of even prima facie plausibility. Appearances, in
this case, I contend, are deceiving.
6. PPO and Editioning
What exactly is motivating standard printmaking practice? The
practice of editioning surely results from material and financial
considerations (e.g., templates degrade and scarcity
determines value). Many printmaking procedures are such that
only a handful of relevantly similar prints may be culled from
the plate. Gum printing is notorious for being so unpredictable
that only a few relevantly similar prints can be reasonably
expected. Even in the normally fruitful Intaglio technique, a
drypoint on Plexiglas will yield only half a dozen relevantly
similar prints. Moreover, printmakers rely financially on
editioning prints; prints from smaller editions ceteris paribus
are worth more money (can command more money) than
those prints from larger or open editions. Often, material
considerations aside, the relationship between monetary value
and the demand determine the size of the edition. The practice
of editioning prints, in the main, looks to be entirely motivated
by material and financial factors (both historically and
contemporarily).
Being so motivated, however, doesn't mean that PPO can
blithely dismiss the practice of editioning prints. On the
contrary, PPO, in its appeal to relevant similarity, looks to be
at least consistent with, if not supportive of, the practice of
editioning. Since the kind of materials and printing techniques
employed largely determine the number of relevantly similar
prints likely to result, then the number of relevantly similar
prints likely to result acts as an upper bound for the edition.
When printmakers, at least of the reasonable sort, decide to
print an edition of n prints, they believe at least minimally that
the printing process can reasonably yield at least n+1
relevantly similar prints; otherwise they invite disaster. The
very notion of editioning, in order to be substantive, seems to
depend on the notion of relevant similarity. So, PPO runs
parallel with, rather than counter to, the practice of
editioning.[4]
Of course, one might argue that PPO nevertheless fails to
distinguish between editioned prints, open or limited, and noneditioned prints, such as artist proofs and trial proofs. Whether
or not a print is an artist proof or a trial proof or part of an
open or limited edition is largely intention-determined, that is,
what purpose the print was intended to serve, especially
whether or not the print was intended for public reception.
Surely such distinctions must be preserved when considering

prints as artworks. Unlike RPO, PPO fails to preserve such
distinctions, so RPO remains the clear choice. Notice, however,
that PPO doesn't claim that such intentions are irrelevant to
standard printmaking practice. PPO need only either claim that
such intentions fail to have their relevancy carried over to
prints as artworks or show that counting them as relevant to
prints as artworks leads to counter-intuitive results.
7. PPO and the Purpose Relation
PPO does not claim that intentions do not matter tout court.
One could easily hold PPO and also hold that intentions are
descriptively necessary features of any artwork, prints or
otherwise. A clever advocate of PPO need only claim that the
relevant intentions are already in play prior to employing PPO,
that is, whether a pair of prints share a causal history and are
roughly qualitatively identical in virtue of that shared causal
history is largely intention-determined. The particular plate
material (copper, Plexiglas, wood), the particular process
employed (intaglio, woodcut, lithography), the particular image
on the plate, and the particular impressions printed are all
largely intention-determined. PPO relies on this fact. PPO
merely entails that further intentions over and above those
involved in relevant similarity simply fail to figure in a print's
being an artwork.[5] An artist's intention that a print be an
artist proof is no more relevant to that print being an artwork
than is the artist's intention that a print be used as a napkin
to absorb a spill. If that print comes out as an artwork,
according to PPO, then the artist is using an artwork as an
artist proof (or an artwork as a napkin). While some may
perhaps find it distasteful to use an artwork as a napkin,
surely employing an artwork as a guide to the production of
relevantly similar artworks should be unproblematic. Again,
PPO doesn't jettison intentions; PPO merely claims that
intentions over and above those fixing relevant similarity count
neither for nor against a print's being art.
Furthermore, appeals to artworld practice won't strengthen the
case against PPO. Artworld practice is horribly inconsistent
with respect to the treatment of non-editioned prints. While
many artists archive their artist proofs, some artists, especially
those employing printmaking techniques that yield few usable
prints (e.g., gum printing or monotyping), happily display and
sell any relevantly similar artist proof along with those in the
edition, ¾especially in monotyping cases where the artist
proof may be the only workable print. In fact, whether or not
artist proofs or trial proofs get regarded as artworks often
depends either on whether or not they are relevantly similar to
those prints in the edition or on the presence or absence of
any workable editioned print.[6] Moreover, any artworld
resistance met by non-editioned prints seems to be inversely
proportional to the fame of the artist. Artist proofs and, even
more strikingly, trial proofs of Warhol's Flowers (1970) get
displayed, sold, and regarded just as those in the edition
(though in most cases, but not all, they are more affordable
than those in the edition).
The above examples shouldn't count as evidence for artworld
practice endorsing PPO. On the contrary, most artist proofs
and master proofs lie unseen in studio flat-files, and trial
proofs often get destroyed. The point is that artworld practice,

with regard to print artworks, inconsistently conforms to and
frequently and arbitrarily departs from standard printmaking
practice. Even were we to assume that all departures from
standard printmaking practice are prima facie justified in virtue
of the presence or absence of reception-intentions, there could
nevertheless be a printmaking equivalent of Emily Dickinson or
Franz Kafka¾an artist who never intends that her prints be
displayed, sold, or even received by the artworld public. Just
as those cases aren't worrisome for poetry and literature, they
shouldn't trouble PPO. This all assumes either that noneditioned prints are never intended for reception or that noneditioned prints cannot coherently be intended for reception.
Both assumptions, however, are quite clearly false. While
being an artist proof entails a certain intentional relation, as
the above examples amply demonstrate, being an artist proof
needn't also entail the exclusion of reception-intentions.
Given all this, PPO shouldn't be burdened with underwriting
wholesale artworld practice with regard to prints as artworks.
Rather, PPO ought to correct artworld practice, telling us what
features of standard printmaking practice count as substantive
for prints as artworks. PPO claims that only relevant similarity
matters, and, therefore, artworld practice ought to reflect this.
Notice that PPO needn't also entail that a print's being an artist
proof or a trial proof is irrelevant tout court. PPO claims that a
print's being an artist proof or a trial proof simpliciter counts
neither for nor against that print's being an artwork, allowing,
at least in principle, for artworld practice to make substantive
evaluative distinctions between editioned and non-editioned
prints. Of course, one can still argue that artworld practice, if
guided by PPO, would end up a counter-intuitive mess. On the
contrary, I argue that artworld practice consistent with RPO is
far more pernicious.
Assume that RPO has it right; that is, assume that the
intentions behind artist proofs, trial proofs, and master proofs
are able to trump considerations from relevant similarity. One
of two things must be then be the case: either (1) artist
proofs, for example, cannot be artworks or (2) artist proofs
can be artworks, but what makes them artworks must be
distinct from what makes relevantly similar editioned prints
artworks, rendering inert any pairwise comparison.[7] Consider
an editioned print numbered 1/25 and a relevantly similar
artist proof (A.P.) Assume for the sake of argument, that 1/25
is an artwork in virtue of possessing feature F. Since 1/25 and
A.P. are relevantly similar, 1/25 has F if and only if A.P. has F,
so A.P. also has F. If (1) is correct, then somehow in virtue of
being an artist proof, A.P. gets disqualified from being art
despite having F. If (2) is correct, then if A.P. is an artwork, it
cannot be an artwork in virtue of having F, even though A.P.
has F in the same way that 1/25 has F and having F is what
makes 1/25 an artwork. So, if A.P. is an artwork, it can't be an
artwork in virtue of having F. Given that the only relevant
difference between A.P. and 1/25 is that A.P. is an artist proof
and 1/25 is an editioned print, what then could possibly make
A.P. an artwork that is distinct from what makes 1/25 an
artwork? For (1) to be correct requires only that being an
artist proof disqualifies A.P. from being art (e.g., being
editioned is at least necessary). For (2) to be correct,
however, requires being an artist proof to be sufficient for
A.P.'s being art; ¾it couldn't be anything else. So, if RPO is

correct, then either (1) or (2) is true. The latter looks wildly
implausible, so it must be the former: artist proofs cannot be
artworks.
Assuming this, imagine the following case. An artist gathers
her editioned prints with the intention of numbering them 1 to
25. Unbeknownst to her, she has mixed up a trial proof with a
print from the edition. She then numbers the trial proof "1/25"
and labels the print from the edition "T.P." I assume that
labeling a print "T.P." doesn't in fact then make that print a
trial proof and that a trial proof labeled "1/25" is still a trial
proof and not from the edition. Given this, should we regard
the future buyer of "1/25" as an unfortunate RPO dupe who
falsely believes that she has purchased an artwork? Should we
regard the future buyer of "A.P." as unknowingly lucky for
getting an otherwise expensive artwork for a bargain non-art
price? Clearly such labeling mishaps shouldn't be relevant to
prints as artworks. What matters for prints as artworks is that
the prints are relevantly similar. That is, if "1/25" is relevantly
similar to "T.P.," then if the editioned print is an artwork, then
so too is the trial proof. PPO makes sense of this while RPO
only makes a mess.
8. PPO and Licitness
Recall our enterprising print thief. Imagine that this time, the
thief makes off with both plate and press. This thief, wellversed in printmaking techniques, proceeds to run off
thousands of prints from the stolen plate ( assuming no plate
degradation occurs). PPO tells us that as long as these prints
are relevantly similar to those printed by the artist for an
edition, if those editioned prints are artworks, then so too are
those thousands illicitly printed. Intuition tells us, however,
that the illicitness of those prints trumps considerations from
relevant similarity. RPO accommodates this intuition, PPO does
not, so RPO is preferable.
Again, appealing to artworld practices won't strengthen the
case against PPO. If our intuitions track artworld practice and
artworld practice is inconsistent, then we shouldn't be
surprised when our intuitions begin to conflict. If intuition tells
us that licitness matters in the thief case, then our intuition
ought to tell us that licitness matters in analogous cases;
otherwise, why think running afoul of this intuition counts
against PPO. Consider prints made from a Rembrandt plate.
The artworld distinguishes between "lifetime impressions"
(those made during Rembrandt's lifetime) and "late
impressions" (those made after his death), but this distinction
serves only as a function of value rather than art status. Late
impressions are regarded as artworks just as much as lifetime
impressions, though less valuable in virtue of less provenance.
Dozens and dozens of original Rembrandt plates still exist, and
prints are still made from them, all presumably lacking
Rembrandt's explicit or implicit permission. PPO, unlike RPO,
allows for both the "life" and "late" impressions to be artworks.
Perhaps, in defense of RPO, someone might claim that "late"
impressions could be artworks if, for instance, the printing was
sanctioned by a legally recognized executor of Rembrandt's
estate. Such a claim should appear prima facie absurd because
it employs only the thinnest notion of licitness¾legal
sanctioning¾and an even thinner notion of Rembrandt¾the

executor of his estate. Again, imagine a Franz Kafka of
printmaking commanding his printmaking Max Brod to destroy
all his templates. The same notion of licitness is in play here
as in the plate-thief's case. PPO rightly regards these
intentions as superfluous precisely because all of the
substantive intentions have already done the work required of
them. In the Rembrandt case, Rembrandt's intentions clearly
matter because the intentions fixing relevant similarity for the
prints are Rembrandt's. The intentions of executors, curators,
or plate thieves shouldn't figure in whether or not the prints
are artworks.
Now imagine that our thief steals a Rembrandt plate, or steals
the plates from our printmaking Max Brod. Just as we
shouldn't think notions of legality and estate executors can
substantively stand-in for robust licitness with regard to
Rembrandt's intentions, we shouldn't likewise think that the
resultant prints from the stolen Rembrandt plate fail to be
artworks even though their licitly (legally) printed, relevantly
similar cousins are. Although our thief may be forced to sell
the Rembrandt prints on the black-market to avoid capture,
the thief nevertheless is selling artworks, a fact her or his
buyers, as art collectors, understand perfectly. Likewise for the
original stolen plate case. Notice that none of these cases are
forgery cases, that is, our thief isn't trying to pass off the
artist's work as her own. If our thief runs a print, in the right
sort of way, of a Rembrandt plate, then the result is a
Rembrandt print, and Rembrandt prints are artworks. That's
the point of lifting the Rembrandt plate in the first place. PPO
captures this, RPO,(so described, cannot. What we ought to be
worried about is prints from forged plates, prints from faded
Rembrandt plates that have been re-etched, or just prints
from faded Rembrandt plates. PPO needn't claim that prints in
these cases satisfy relevant similarity.
9. PPO and Accidental Prints
Much the same can be said for accidental prints. Recall that
the objection against PPO wasn't about purely accidental
objects that look like prints, only appearing to be relevantly
similar to other prints. The objection against PPO had to do
with prints that were accidentally printed. If it turns out that
something's being a print entails that it could not have been
accidentally printed, then PPO has no worries since it ranges
over only pairs of prints. Let's assume then for sake of
argument that prints can be accidentally printed, and that
being accidentally printed (non-intentionally printed) trumps
considerations from relevant similarity such that one ought to
prefer RPO. This objection really looks to be merely a
subspecies of licit/illicit objection. I do think, however, a brief
response instructive.
Imagine that Smith readies everything to do a large relief
print. In order to accommodate the size, Smith decides to
employ a large steamroller rather than a printing press.
Having laid down the plate and paper, Smith goes to fetch the
steamroller. Through sheer coincidence and faulty wiring, the
steamroller starts up and lurches forward unmanned, running
squarely and firmly over Smith's plate and paper, producing a
print identical to the one Smith would have produced (ceteris
paribus) were he to have piloted the steamroller. Smith should

deem this a fortuitous accident rather than shake his fists at
the heavens. What matters to Smith is that enough pressure
gets exerted to transfer the ink adequately; that he drives the
steamroller, his sister drives it, or it goes unmanned matters
not to him insofar as printmaking is concerned. Moreover, we
could imagine while Smith is futilely attempting to start the
steamroller, a high school marching band unknowingly
tramples over his plate and paper. As long as the marching
band exerted enough pressure to transfer the ink, Smith
should be satisfied. PPO needn't unnecessarily fine-grain
causal history; PPO can retain its strength even while coarsegraining causal history to capture mere range of pressureexertion as sufficient, for certain kinds of printmaking
techniques. Again, certain relations that initially appear to be
substantive for print artworks, upon closer scrutiny, fall away,
leaving only relevant similarity. If only relevant similarity
remains, then RPO too falls away, leaving only PPO.
10. Conclusion
Basic print ontology isn't itself a problem. What it is for two
prints to be relevantly similar isn't itself a problem. The fact
that prints can be artworks isn't itself a problem. The real
problem lies with combining these so as to create an
informative principle about the relationship between relevantly
similar prints as artworks, a principle that tells us what
conditions must be met such that, for any two relevantly
similar prints, one is an artwork if and only if the other is an
artwork. Standard printmaking practice alone can't ground
such a principle. Neither can artworld practice because
artworld practice is inconsistent with regard to the relevance
to prints as artworks certain intentional relations standard
printmaking practice counts substantive. To be consistent,
artworld practice must either respect only relevant similarity
(PPO) or must also count as substantive at least some
intentional relation over above those involved in fixing relevant
similarity (RPO). The persuasiveness and plausibility of RPO
over PPO relies on there being a persuasive and plausible
specification of intentional relation r, such that artworld
practice consistent with RPO is preferable to artworld practice
consistent with PPO. I have shown that there are no such
intentional relations. PPO is the clear choice, and, therefore,
relevant similarity is exhaustive.[8]
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Endnotes
I owe special thanks to Aaron Meskin, Derk Pereboom, Earl
Conee, and the anonymous referees for their suggestions and
criticisms and to print artists Jeffery Stone and Jamie Davis for
sharing their printmaking knowledge.

[1] Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing 1976) and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds
of Art (Oxford: Claredon Press 1980). For a rare contemporary
example see John Dilworth's article "Pictorial Orientation
Matters," British Journal of Aesthetics 23 (2003), 39-56.
[2] RPO differs from PPO in that RPO claims as additionally
determinative some relational (intentional) property that does
not supervene on, or is not in fact largely determined by, a
relevant descriptive physical (internal) feature of the print.
Also notice that I offer no definition of what it is to be an
author (individual or collective). I need only appeal to common
sense, and I leave it up to the reader to fill in the details.
[3] When artists themselves print editions, they almost never
print more than the edition requires, as the process is really is
labor-intensive. So the artist proof in this case functions as the
master proof or Bon-a-Tirer proof ("good to print") and
typically gets archived by the artist. Printmakers in the artist's
employ, however, almost always print more than is required.
Those leftover are returned to the artist and typically labeled
"A.P." for artist proof. My arguments are such that which
sense gets used needn't matter (unless otherwise specified).
[4] Notice that PPO deals perfectly well with extreme cases
such as monotyping (transferring ink from a smooth surface to
paper by pressing). The process behind monotyping yields a
unique print; not enough ink is left on the smooth surface for
another impression. Subsequent printing attempts result in
vastly inferior and incomplete impressions, violating the
relevant similarity condition set by PPO.
[5] Whether a print is an artist proof depends on a certain
intentional relation, but presumably being an artist proof does
not in fact supervene (or is not largely determined by) features
internal to the print (in contrast to say a print's being a
representation of Abraham Lincoln or having this or that
aesthetic property).
[6] Notice that trial proofs in the main won't be problematic for
PPO given that most trial proofs (save master proofs) likely fail
to be relevantly similar to those in the edition. The same goes
for the points made in Nigel Warburton's peripherally related
article "Authentic Photographs," British Journal of Aesthetics
37 (1997), 129-37.
[7] Notice that PPO can account for the latter—art status may
be overdetermined.
[8] I think that this result may have some interesting
implications for other art forms. For example, I suppose one
could argue for a PPO-style principle for performances (e.g.,
Permissive Performance Ontology) according to which if
relevant similarity conditions are satisfied, rehearsals count as
performances (or artworks). I make a similar claim about
recordings in my article "Recordings as Performances," British
Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2007). Of course, this is all for
another project.

